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THE IMPACT OF THE UNFUNDED MANDATES
REFORM ACT OF 1995 ON TRIBAL GOVERNMENTS
Eileen M. Luna*
The creation of federal mandates, i.e., legislation that requires mandatory
action or imposes regulations on a subordinate government, has long been a
flash point among state and local governments. Many states have resisted the
imposition or strengthening of federal regulations particularly if those
mandates are not accompanied by funding adequate for their implementation.
In direct response to the rise in concern regarding "states-rights," the 104th
Congress passed the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995 (UMRA) with
the expressed mission:
[T7o curb the practice of imposing unfunded Federal mandates on
states and local governments; to strengthen the partnership
between the Federal Government and State, local and tribal
governments; to end the imposition, in the absence of full
consideration by Congress, of Federal mandates on State, local,
and tribal governments without adequate funding, in a manner that
may displace other essential governmental priorities; and to ensure
that the Federal Government pays the costs incurred by those
governments in complying with certain requirements under
Federal statutes and regulations, and for other purposes.'
Ironically, at the time congressional hearings were held, not one Indian
advocacy organization or tribal government made a presentation, either for
or against passage This lack of attention to the impact of the Act on
Indian tribal governments continues to date. Out of almost fifty articles that
discuss various aspects of the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995,
none were found which discussed the impact on tribal governments.
Examples of recent federal legislation carrying with them unfunded
mandates include bills which have reduced air and water pollution,4
*Assistant Professor of American Indian Studies, University of Arizona. J.D., Peoples College
of Law; M.P.A., J.F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University. Member,
Chickamauga Band of the Cherokee and Choctaw. Thanks to Robert A. Williams, Jr., Dr. Jay
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1. Pub. L. No. 104-4, 109 Stat. 48, 48 (codified at 2 U.S.C. §§ 1501-1571 (Supp. 111996)).
2. This information was obtained through a legislative history analysis of the Unfunded
Mandates Reform Act of 1995 conducted by the author.
3. An exhaustive search of print media references to the effect of the Unfunded Mandates
Reform Act of 1995 revealed to the author that nobody was considering this impact.
4. Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671q (1994); Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1377
(1994).
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expanded occupational safety and health coverage,' created "motor voter"
rights,6 imposed gun control standards requiring background checks on gun
buyers7 and protected the environment from the impact of asbestos8 and
hazardous waste.' These purposes may seem admirable and important,
however, the costs of mandate implementation have been points of
contention between state, local, and federal governments. Tribal
governments as well, with their already stretched budgets and (usually)
limited economic development and taxing opportunities, are potentially even
more adversely affected when Congress passes legislation imposing
unfunded mandates in Indian country. The struggles for control over
imposed unfunded mandates culminated in the passage of the Unfunded
Mandates Reform Act of 1995 (UMRA), a cornerstone of the Republican
"Contract with America" in 1994.10
The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) has defined an Intergovernmental
Mandate that is subject to UMRA as follows:
An intergovernmental mandate is defined as any provision in
legislation, statute, or regulation that (1) would impose an
enforceable duty upon state, local, or tribal governments, except
when it is a condition of federal assistance or a duty arising from
participation in a voluntary federal program; or (2) would reduce
or eliminate the amount of authorization of appropriations for
federal financial assistance for the purpose of complying with
previously imposed duties. Legislation, statutes, or regulations
that relate to duties arising from participation in voluntary
programs may be considered intergovernmental mandates under
a number of circumstances if those provisions were to increase
the stringency of conditions of assistance or place caps on or
decrease federal funding and if the state, local, or tribal
governments lacked authority under the program to amend their
financial or programmatic responsibilities to continue providing
required services, and if the program is one under which more
5. Occupational Health and Safety Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (1994).
6. Governor Pete Wilson of California stated that the "California Motor Voter program will
be ready to go on Jan. 1, 1995, but it won't go anywhere unless the federal government pays for
the mandate they have imposed." Thomas Atwood & Chris West, Home Rule: How States are
Fighting Unfinded Federal Mandates at para. 35 (visited Nov. 18, 1997)
<http:/www.heritage.org/heritage/libraryl>.
7. Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act (Brady Bill) of 1994, Pub. L. No. 104-
294, 18 U.S.C. § 921 (1994).
8. Toxic Substances Control Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2671 (1994).
9. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9657 (1994).
10. Timothy J. Conlon et al., Deregulating Federalism? The Politics of Mandate Reform in
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than $500 million is given to state and local governments under
permanent authority."
UMRA specifically establishes a process for "meaningful and timely
input (by state, local and tribal governments) in the development of
regulatory proposals containing significant Federal intergovernmental
mandates."'1 2 Under Section 401 of UMRA, however, no right exists for
judicial review or appeal regarding "any estimate, analysis, statement,
description or report... [as to] any compliance or noncompliance with the
provisions of [the] Act [nor as to] any determination concerning the
applicability of the provisions of this Act ... .
The Wall Street Journal4 cited a report by the Advisory Commission on
Intergovernmental Relations (ACIR) that more than 100 new mandates were
imposed on state governments by the federal government during the Reagan-
Bush years, compared with approximately sixteen during the 1940s. 5 By
August 1996, during the first year of implementation of UMRA, the CBO
reviewed a total of 592 bills, of which sixty-two were found to contain
mandates. Of this number, eleven were found to contain mandates that
were estimated to exceed the threshold of $50 million or more, which is the
amount that triggers the exercise of UMRA 7 .
With the passage of UMRA, Congress took a new approach, thereby
positively impacting Indian country if utilized properly. The idea that the
federal government might decide to constrain its plenary power to pass
legislation binding the state, local, and tribal governments is one that Indian
legal experts and tribal advocates can use to fair advantage. Although plenary
power is ostensibly exclusive and absolute, it is not unlimited. As is asserted
in one of the leading Indian law casebooks:
Although no exercise of Congressional power over Indian matters
has been set aside, the Supreme Court has said it will review such
actions to assure that they are rationally tied to the fulfillment of
Congress' unique obligation toward Indians. To the extent that
11. Congressional Budget Office, Implications for Providing Cost Estimates Under the
Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995 at para. 8 (visited Jan. 20, 1997) <http'./
gopher.cbo.gov:710010/reportslonllne/safewater/ascii/chapt6.tx> (on file with theAmerican Indian
Law Review).
12. 2 U.S.C. § 1534(a) (Supp. II 1996).
13. lId § 1571(b)(1).
14. Matthew Reese, The Mandate Millstone, WALL ST. J., Aug. 18, 1993, at A10.
15. Id
16. Larry Jones, Has the Mandate Madness Stopped?, COuNTY NEws (Nat'l Ass'n of
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Congress has not limited or terminated Indian rights, however, the
courts will scrupulously enforce them."
Where, as here, Congress has recognized the need for restraint and has
passed legislation requiring Congress to carefully consider the exercise of its
plenary power and the impact of such action, such legislation can serve as a
message to courts that the exercise of any such power is suspect. Tribal
governments may use it as a platform to challenge new legislative assertions
of power detrimental to the wishes and/or tribal interests, thereby raising
fundamental issues about congressional exercise of plenary power.
The purpose of this article is to provide: (1) an understanding of the
Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995 and the uses to which it can be put
to advance the sovereignty of Indian nations and reduce the opportunity for
the exercise of federal plenary power, (2) an overview of federal laws
presently affecting tribal governments and how these could trigger UMRA,
and (3) rxommendations that could increase the positive benefits of UMRA
for tribal governments. Although this legislation is new and relatively untested
and arises out of a conservative "state's rights" perspective, tribal governments
can use the language of the Act to their advantage in their legislative dealings
with federal, state, and local governments.
L 7he Legislative History of the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act
A. "States Rights" and Mandate Reform
Recent dissatisfaction with the federal authority to impose requirements on
the states and local governments dates back to the early 1980s. Even though
Ronald Reagan spoke out against them, unfunded mandates increased
significantly during his eight years in the White House." This concern
reached a peak during the 103rd Congress when more than thirty mandate
reform bills were proposed.' The leadership of both Houses refused to allow
a vote on either the Community Regulatory Relief Act (Senate Bill which
would have absolutely forbidden any federal mandate without the provision
of full federal funding, or the Federal Mandate Relief Act of 1993 (House Bill
140), a somewhat less restrictive bill, even though these were ultimately co-
sponsored by a majority of Senate and House members." Congress also
failed to pass less restrictive bills similar to UMRA negotiated by Sen. Dirk
Kempthorne (R.-Idaho) and Sen. John Glenn (D.-Ohio), or another, House Bill
5128, sponsored by Rep. John Conyers (D.-Mich.) and Rep. William F.
Clinger (R.-Penn.).
18. DAVID H. GETcHEs Er AL., FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 4-5 (3d ed. 1993).
19. See Conlan, Deregulating Federalism, supra note 10, at 24.
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The change in the fortunes of mandate reform came about with the
congressional elections of 1994. With the election of the 104th Congress,
legislators were swept in who were wedded to the "Contract with America," of
which the UMRA was a cornerstone 3 To underscore the priority of mandate
reform for the new Republican majority, Sen. Bob Dole (R.-Kan.), Senate
Majority Leader, designated the Kempthorne-Glenn bill as Senate Bill 1, thus
ensuring that the Senate would hear this bill first during that legislative session.
The inclusion of "tribal governments" in the language of UMRA was
apparently an offshoot of an Indian nations' movement to assert the rights of
self-determination and self-government during the 1980s.' During this
decade tribes began to take charge of their own resources and economic
development. By the mid-1980s fifty-two tribes began to emphasize mineral
production from tribal land. Other tribes emphasized development in
agriculture or sustainable resources. 6 Tribes also began to move politically.
Tribes held voter registration drives, significantly increasing the number of
Indian voters.' The National Congress of American Indians formed a tribal
political action committee to fight cutbacks in federal spending and to
influence local and federal elections.' This growth in tribal budgets and
political involvement, coupled with President Clinton's 1994 Executive Order,
served to place tribal governments on more equal footing with state and local
governments.? Given President Clinton's recent explicit recognition of tribal
government status, it is reasonable to speculate how tribal protests against
legislation that imposes federal mandates without financial compensation can
23. Id.
24. CENTER FOR WORLD INDIGENOUS STUDIES, INDIAN SELF-GOVERNMENT PROCESS
EVALUATION REPORT (1996) [hereinafter INDIAN SELF GOVERNMENT PROCESS EVALUATION
REPORT]. This report emphasizes the results of the move during the 1980s toward tribal self-
government. Although it notes that there has been considerable success toward economic and
social development, the 33 Indian governments which have undertaken and completed compacts
of self-government with the United States between 1990 and 1995 have had less success in
political development. The report states: "[I]f Indian nations have weaker tribal governments then
they are more likely to experience state government attempts to take control over Indian people
and lands." Id. at 3 (quoting Milner Ball, Constitution, Court, Indian Tribes, 1987 AM. B.
FOUND. RES. J. 1, 76 (1987)). In order to offset this concern, the 1994 Executive Order directs
that tribal governments be treated equally with states, and that self-governance be both
encouraged and supported.
25. STEPHEN CORNELL, THE RETURN OF THE NATIVE 199 (1988).
26. Id. at 199-200.
27. Id. at 167.
28. Karen MacPherson, Indians Nationwide Plan Stronger Voting Drives, SANTA FE NEw
MEXICAN, Mar. 8, 1996, available in LEXIS, News Library, Newmex File.
29. William Jefferson Clinton, Government to Government Relations with Native American
Tribal Governments: Memorandumfor the Heads of Executive Departments andAgencies (visited
Nov. 18, 1997) <http://www.codetalk.fed.us/g-to.g.htrnl>.
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also serve to challenge the assertion of federal plenary power against tribal
interests.
The stated purposes of the UMRA are: (1) the strengthening of
"partnership" between the federal and state, local, and tribal governments;
(2) the end of unwarranted imposition of federal mandates on the various
governments without concomitant provision of adequate funding; (3) the
notification to Congress of the possible extent of such fiscal impact on the
various governments prior to a vote on the proposed legislation; and (4) the
development of a process designed to obtain the input from the affected
governments regarding the legislation." These purposes read like a "states
rights" Exgument for tribal governments to use when adversely affected by
federal legislation.
B. Process
The UMRA establishes a mechanism whereby Congress receives
information regarding the fiscal implications of legislation prior to its
passage.' Whenever requested by a member of Congress, or at the point
where a proposed bill passes out of committee, the CBO is required by the
Act to prepare a cost-estimation report. 2 If the CBO determines that the
bill contains unfunded mandates with estimated direct costs of over $50
million annually, members of Congress may trigger a "point of order."33
If a federal regulation is estimated to cost $100 million to state or local
governments combined, or the private sector, federal agencies must explain
the costs, expected benefits and the economic implications of the regulations
prior to congressional consideration. If a point of order is raised, the
sponsor of the bill must obtain funding to pay for the implementation of the
procedures mandated by the legislation or win a majority vote of both
houses of Congress to waive the requirement and, thus, enact the legislation
without federal funding.' This, then, ensures that a majority of Congress
is either willing to underwrite the cost of the implementation of the
mandate, or considers the costs of the mandate to be properly the business
of state, local or tribal governments.
UMIRA establishes a second set of regulations on Congress. The
Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Affairs (ACIA) is charged by
the Ac3 with identifying and reviewing existing mandates. ACIA then
makes recommendations to the President and Congress in order to allow
30. See 2 U.S.C. § 1501 (Supp. II 1996).
31. Id § 658(b).
32. It.
33. U.S. SENATE DEMOCRATIC POLICY COMM., S-1: THE UNFUNDED MANDATE REFORM
Acr OF 1995, at 1 (1995).
34. Jones, supra note 16, at para. 8.
35. 2 U.S.C. § 1551(a) (Supp. 11 1996).
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flexibility for state, local and tribal governments and facilitates compliance
with those "unnecessarily rigid" or "complex" federal mandates, and
eliminates or temporarily suspends those "duplicative, obsolete or lacking
in practical utility" mandates and those mandates "not vital to the public
health and safety and which compound the fiscal difficulties faced by those
governments.""
C. "Indian Country Rights" and Mandate Reform
Tribal governments should view UMRA as a beneficial tool. In many
ways it supports a "states rights" for tribes. The Act generally requires
funding of federal mandates creating an undue hardship on tribes. Given
limited resources, many, if not most, tribal governments may find it difficult
to fund any federal requirements, particularly as tribes take on more
responsibilities through self-governance. Where applicable, the Act will
ensure that the financial burden resulting from the passage of federal
mandates will not "break the bank."
One problem with the legislation is that the $50 and $100 million
amounts are cumulative. 7 Where an unfunded mandate affects any state,
local or tribal government, the total impact is considered. Where, however,
the legislation specifically affects only tribal governments, the possible
fiscal impact is considered as to those entities only. Given the small land
base of Indian nations and the limited number of functions that most
undertake without full federal funding, if the pending legislation affects only
tribal governments, the Indian nations will almost never attain the $50
million threshold. This limits the benefits to tribal governments that were
intended to result from the exercise of UMRA and makes it significantly
less likely that UMRA will affect the legislation.
A recent example of the operation of UMRA as it relates to Indian
country occurred with a bill which sought to expand the regulation of
boxing matches, known as House Bill 4167.8 This bill requires that any
Indian nation seeking to hold a professional boxing match held within its
reservation must conduct the match under regulations and safety standards
at least as restrictive as those most recently certified and published by the
Association of Boxing Commissions or as the applicable standards and
requirements of a state in which the reservation is located. 9 This
legislation would impact the tribes by requiring the costly addition of tribal
staff charged with the development and monitoring of additional, restrictive
regulations. The Congressional Budget Office found that the Professional
36. Id. §1532(a)(3).
37. See generally id. § 658.
38. Professional Boxing Safety Act of 1996 (H.R. 4167), Pub. L. No. 104-272, 110 Stat.
3309 (codified at 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 6301-6313 (West Supp. 1997)).
39. Id. § 6312(b).
No. 2]
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Boxing Safety Act of 1996 (House Bill 4167) created an unfunded mandate
on tribal governments, although Congress knew that the estimated cost did
not exceed the $50 million threshold which could trigger a point of order.4"
The Act was passed and became law on October 21, 1996, without the
additional federal funding necessary to help the tribes meet the costs of
implementation.4'
IL Problems with Implementation of UMRA in Indian Country
An unfunded mandate is the federal requirement of a state, local or tribal
government to do something for which they are not reimbursed by the
federal government. The imposition of an unfunded mandate has serious
consequences for any subordinate government. State and local governments
protect their sovereign powers and often challenge the requirements imposed
on them by the federal government. The recent logging preclusions and
requirement of land trades to protect old growth trees in Alaska and
Northern California are examples of the exercise of federal power against,
in some instances, the wishes of some state officials and the resultant
struggles of the states to resist or control restraints on the exercise of their
sovereign authority.42
Where the states differ from tribal governments, however, is that the
states have absolute control over their fiscal resources. They have the power
to levy property and other taxes, to enter into contracts, to sell or transfer
their lands, and to invest their monies as they see fit. Tribal governments
are in a different, and more difficult, situation.
One of the most serious concerns regarding federal mandates as they
relate to tribal governments is that these governments are not legally
empowered to enter into contract agreements affecting an interest in their
lands without the approval of the Secretary of the Bureau of Indian
Affairs. 3 Tribal governments cannot transfer an interest in their own land
without specific legislative authorization." Further, often tribal
governments do not collect or control their own income. Instead, payments
for leases, mineral rights, contracts and other economic endeavors, as well
as allocations of trust funds, are controlled and parceled out by the Bureau
of Indian Affairs."'
Many tribal governments obtain most of their funds from, and are held
accountable for their expenditures to, the Bureau of Indian Affairs Trust
40. See supra note 33.
41. Professional Boxing Safety Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-272, 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. (110
Stat.) 3309.
42. Eugene Linden et al., Of Jobs, Profits and Forests, TIME, Oct. 14, 1996, at 66-68.
43. See GurCHES ET AL., supra note 18, at 627.
44. IL
45. 1I1 at 23-24, 627-28.
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Division.' Therefore, in light of revelations of the serious mismanagement
and loss of over $2.6 billion in tribal trust funds by the BIA,47 many in
Indian country feel that any mandate is unfunded as, even if funoing
attaches, there is a significant danger that any reimbursement money may
never reach the affected tribal governments.
The issue of control is one that also negatively affects tribal governments.
For many programs, including housing, law enforcement and others, the
control over provision of the service, and the nature of the service provided,
is in the hands of federal agencies and the Bureau of Indian Affairs." Tribal
governments are allowed varying levels of input but rarely control all essential
elements.49 They often are not even consulted as to how something should
be done, let alone whether it should be done.' This lack of control may
cause a complication when dealing with compliance under the UMRA as the
mandate may apply to government of the Indian nation, while the power to
control the provision or type of service may rest with the BIA or other federal
agencies.
Other issues affecting Indian country and coloring the perspective of
Indians in dealing with federal, state and local governments are dealt with
specifically in the following sections. However there is one over-riding
perspective that permeates Indian country. Many in Indian country feel that
other governments, be they federal or state, have little or no business telling
another government what to do.5" There is a resistance, in particular, to
incursions of state or local authority into decisions made by the Indian
nation, or as to self-government issues.52 The Indian nations may find it
difficult to accept the imposition of any mandate, but particularly one which
is unfunded.
In order to explore the impact of the Act, this article proceeds in
segments, related to specific bodies of federal law and issues of state
authority in Indian country. The first section is a brief historical overview
and discussion of the concept of tribal sovereignty, and how the concept is
impacted by the function of federal and state law. Those federal laws that
46. Ud. at 24-26.
47. See U.S. General Accounting Office, Report to the Committee on Indian Affairs, U.S.
Senate: BIA's Tribal Trust Fund Account Reconciliation Results at 3 (May 19, 1996)
(GAO/AIMD-96-63); U.S. General Accounting Office, Report to the Committee on Indian
Affairs: DOI's Efforts to Reconcile Indian Tribal Fund Accounts and Implement Improvements
at 2 (June 11, 1996) (GAO/T-AIMD-96-104).
48. See GErcHEs Er At., supra note 18, at 16-20.
49. For more on the subject of congressional plenary power, see id. at 324-34.
50. Id. at 325.
51. See Larry Kinley, Principles for Negotiating a Self Government Agreement, in INDIAN
SELF GOVERNMENT PROCESS EVALUATION REPORT, supra note 24, at 11-13.
52. GETCHE ET AL., supra note 18, at 453-58.
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most often affect Indian country, and how they apply to tribal governments
are then discussed, particularly in light of the imposition of mandates.
III. The Concept of Tribal Sovereignty
When Indian nations first began to deal with the federal government
they were sovereign. 3 They exercised independent authority to govern
themselves, and no other nation was depended upon to legitimate their acts
of government. After colonization of the continent, Indian nations accepted
certain limitations on such sovereignty and significant losses of land and
resources in exchange for treaty agreements. These treaty agreements and
subsequent legal decisions interpreting them protected the Indian nations'
rights of self-government and the understanding that the powers exercised
by tribal governments were inherent to sovereigns, not something that had
been granted to them by the Constitution.
In what is more commonly referred to as the "Marshall Trilogy," the U.S.
Supreme Court decided three cases in the early 1800s establishing a number
of principles that remain the basis for the federal-tribal relationship. These
principles are the following:
(1) The federal government has "plenary power" over Indian matters.
This means that federal treaties and statutes prevail over state law."
(2) The status of Indian nations was established as "dependent sovereign'
nations" to the federal government. Thus, Indian nations cannot enter into
agreements with other countries, nor can they alienate their lands except to
the federal government.55
(3) Treaties between Indian nations and the federal government were
interpreted to establish that Indian nations retained the right to self-
government within the territories reserved to them, without constraint by
any other entities, including state governments."'
(4) Certain "Canons of Construction" were established for the
interpretation of treaties with Indian nations. These Canons provided that
when construing the treaties they were interpreted as understood by the
Indians. Ambiguities within treaties or statutes were interpreted in the
Indians' favor. Treaties and federal Indian laws were interpreted liberally
and they were to favor retained tribal self-government, rather than state or
federal authority.'
53. For more on sovereignty, see generally GETcHs Er AL., supra note 18; WILLIAM C.
CANBY, JR., AMERICAN INDIAN LAW IN A NUTSHELL (2d ed. 1988); and ROBERT N. CLINTON ET
AL, AMERICAN INDIAN LAw (3d ed. 1991).
54. GrcHEs ET AL., supra note 18, at 122-55.
55. CANBY, supra note 53, at 68.
56. ld at 109.
57. GErcHEs Er AL., supra note 18, at 155-66.
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(5) The protection of land, guaranteed in the treaties, was later extended
to the right to use and develop the resources of the land for the economic
self-interest of Indian nations."
During the early years of the twentieth century the Supreme Court began
to allow more incursions of federal power into Indian country, thus
endangering the internal sovereignty of Indian nations."' Prior to a number
of court decisions in the 1930s and 1940s, the Supreme Court had held to
the concept that general federal laws, like state laws, were not applicable
to Indians within Indian country. This changed significantly with the
Supreme Court ruling in Federal Power Commission v. Tuscarora Indian
Nation,' wherein the Court held that absent a treaty or federal statute to
the contrary, federal laws of general applicability apply also to Indians and
tribal governments.
This assertion of the federal government's power has been moderated
slightly since Tuscarora. The Court should interpret the general applicable
statutes, treaties, and subsequent legislation so that the treaties are not
abrogated, unless a clear congressional intent is established.6
The law has been recently settled as to the sovereign status of Alaska
Native villages. Unlike most federally-recognized tribal governments in the
United States, the Villages do not have territorial integrity as reservations.62
They are instead owned by village corporations in fee simple. The Alaska
Native Claims Settlement Act (ANSCA),63 passed in 1971, settled
aboriginal land claims and expressly revoked all reservations in Alaska,
except the Metlakatla reservation, but did not resolve the legal disputes.'
The Alaskan Ninth Circuit District Court held, in State of Alaska v.
Native Village of Venetie Tribal Government,' that the Native villages
were Indian nations. The Court held that the Alaskan Native villages
possessed the same sovereign rights as other Indian nations, and were
dependent Indian communities.'6  Congress has also taken this same
position by including Alaska Natives in all major Indian legislation since
the passage of Alaska Native Claim Settlement Act. It has done so,
however, by specifically including Alaska Natives, as distinguished from
58. United States v. Shoshone Tribe of Indians, 304 U.S. 111, 118 (1938), White Mountain
Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136, 138 (1980).
59. See, e.g., Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553 (1903); United States v. Sandoval, 231
U.S. 28 (1913); Sioux Tribe v. United States, 316 U.S. 317 (1942).
60. 362 U.S. 99, 120 (1960).
61. GErciss ET AL.., supra note 18, at 346-48.
62. Id. at 911-18.
63. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1628 (1994).
64. GarCuas ET AL., supra note 18, at 913-17.
65. 101 F.3d 1286 (9th Cir. 1996), rev'd, No. 96-1577, 1998 WL 75038 (U.S. Feb. 25, 1998)
66. Id. at 1302.
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Indians.67 The UMRA has also been specifically applied to Alaska Villages
in much the same manner.6
IV. Historical Overview
The relationships between the federal governments and Indian nations
were originally conducted by the Executive Branch of the federal
government. The Constitution specifically established that Congress alone
had the power to control economic intercourse with Indian nations.69
However the Supreme Court, in a number of important cases, began to
articulate a series of policies that set the tone and limitations for these
relations.
In the last few years a trend for the resolution of judicial Indian issues
has changed and Congress has begun to assert authority. Congress' inclusion
of tribal governments with states and local governments in the UMRA
facilitates utilization to further the development of Indian sovereignty
considerably. Congress' insertion of language attesting to the equality and
"partnership" status of tribal governments and of the necessity to consider
the fiscal impact of considered legislation on them, prior to the passage of
such legislation, tempers the exercise of Congress' plenary power, extends
the concept of tribal sovereignty and strengthens Indian nations.
The congressional proactive trend recognizing the sovereignty of Indian
nations began in response to a series of negative court decisions by the
Rehnquist court. This movement became obvious in 1992 when Congress
acted to reverse the Supreme Court decision in Duro v. Reina," wherein
the Court had ruled that tribal governments do not have jurisdiction over
non-member Indians.
The shift in emphasis from the courts to Congress follows an historic
period of federal court decisions favorable to Indians. This chain of rulings
began in 1959 and continued for over 30 years. They included a number of
resounding tribal victories against state incursions into Indian country,
including:
- The determination that the Navajo Tribal Court had exclusive
jurisdiction over the collection of a debt owed by Indians to a non-Indian
67. For example, see 2 U.S.C. § 658(13) (Supp. 11 1996).
68. Id.
The term "tribal government" means any Indian tribe, band, nation, or other
organized group or community, including any Alaska Native village or regional
or village corporation as defined in or established pursuant to the Alaska Native
Claims Settlement Act (85 Stat. 688; 43 U.S.C. 1601 et seq.) which is recognized
as eligible for the special programs and services provided by the United States to
Indians because of their special status as Indians.
Id.
69. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3.
70. 495 U.S. 676, 681 (1990).
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merchant on the reservation."
- The invalidation of state income taxes levied on the earnings of an
Indian employed on her reservation.'
- The upholding of the non-Indian convictions for selling liquor in Indian
country without tribal permission."
- The invalidation of state fees that interfered with tribal regulation and
income from non-Indian hunting and fishing.'
These and other tribal victories set the groundwork, thus strengthening the
legal framework as it relates to the sovereignty of Indian nations. Part of this
framework includes court deference to congressional intent in resolving
jurisdictional conflicts between tribal governments and states, a concept which
was first introduced in the 1973 McClanahan decision. This deference re-
inforces the primacy of Congress and of federal laws and legislation in respect
to Indian country and the federal preemption of state laws relating to tribal
governments.
At this point in history Congress has moved to a more conservative
stance, which may make it more difficult for tribal governments to receive
necessary funding for services. However, the "states rights" movement,
supported by the more conservative Congress, has increased momentum. It
is often thought that the best way to advance a concept is to link it to a
"moving train," i.e. an idea that has momentum of its own. The movement
for "states rights" may serve as the vehicle for tribal governments. UMRA
is a direct result of the conservative movement for "states rights." As such,
many may look upon UMRA with skepticism. However, it is possible,
through the assertion of the powers set forth in UMRA, coupled with the
Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act of 1976" to
advance tribal interests and influence, continue the development of tribal
governments, and erode the exercise and perhaps the concept of federal
plenary power.
V. Indian Country Today
There are 327 Indian nations and 223 Alaskan Native organizations that
the United States recognizes officially." There are approximately 129
Indian nations in various stages of the federal-recognition process." Many
71. Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 223 (1959).
72. McClanahan v. Arizona Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164, 181 (1973).
73. United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544, 558 (1975).
74. Mescalero Apache Tribe v. New Mexico, 462 U.S. 324, 344 (1983).
75. Pub. L. No. 93-638, 88 Stat. 2203 (codified and amended at 25 U.S.C. §§ 450-450n,
458-458hh (1994)).
76. For a complete list of federally-recognized tribes, see generally VERONICA E. VELARDE
TILLER, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, AMERICAN INDIAN RESERVATIONS AND TRUST AREAS (1996).
77. GErCHEs Er AL, supra note 18, at 12.
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more Indian nations are state-recognized, 8  or unrecognized, with
California alone having more than forty-six unrecognized Indian nations."
This issue of recognition is critical for our analysis of the impact of
UMRA in Indian country, as only federally-recognized Indian nations are
legally considered "tribal governments" for the purpose of UMRA by the
federal government, and thus as participants in the established
"partnership."8 Unfortunately this leaves state-recognized or unrecognized
tribal governments powerless to use UMRA to protest federal mandates that
might affect them negatively.
VI. Issues of State-Tribal Relationships
In the discussion that follows I have attempted to delineate the powers
possessed by state governments as they relate to Indian country within their
borders. It is necessary to consider those situations where states have power
78. State recognized tribes include the following: In Alabama, the Mowa Band of Choctaws
of SW Alabama, Echota Cherokee, Cherokee of SE Alabama, MaChis Lower Creek, Star Clan-
Muscoge- Creek, and Cherokee of NE Alabama; in Connecticut, the Golden Hill Paugussett,
Paucatuck Eastern Pequot and the Schaghticoke; in Georgia, the Tama; in Louisiana, the Caddo,
Choctaw-Apache of Ebarb, Clifton Choctaw, Louisiana Choctaw, and United Houma Nation; in
Massachusetts, the Hassanamisco; in Missouri, the Northern Cherokee and the Chickamauga
Cherokee; in North Carolina, the Coharie, Haliwa-Saponi, Lumbee, Meherrin and Waccamaw-
Siouan' in New Jersey, the Rankokus; in New York, the Poospatuck and Shinnecock; and in
Virginia, the Mattaponi and the Pamunkey. See GEORGE RUSSELL, AMERICAN INDIAN
RESERVATION ROsTR 20 (1996) (on file with the American Indian Law Review).
79. Non-recognized tribes include, e.g., in Arkansas, the Ouachita; in Colorado, the Munsee
Thames River Delaware; in Georgia, the Cane Break Band of Eastern Cherokees; in Connecticut,
the Nipmuc; in Indiana, the Upper Kiskopo Band of the Shawnee; in Idaho, the Delawares of
Idaho; in Kansas, the Delaware-Muncie Tribe; in Maine, the Aroostook Band of Micmacs; in
Michigan, the Consolidated Bahwetig Ojibwas & Mackinacs; in Minnesota, NI-MI-WIN
Ojibways; in Massachusetts, the Mashpee, Wampanoag, and Narragansett; in Maryland, the
Piscataway; in New Hampshire, the Abenaki; in New Mexico, the Cononcito Band of Navajos;
in Mississippi, the Grand Village Natchez Indian Tribe; and in Tennessee, the Etowah Cherokee.
See List of Unrecognized Tribes in California (visited Oct. 20, 1997) <http://sorrel.humboldt.edu/
-nasp/unroc.html> (on file with the American Indian Law Review).
80. California unrecognized tribes include the following: Alexander Valley Mishewal
Wappo, Amah Mutsun Band of Mission Indians, American Indian Council of Mariposa, Antelope
Valley Paiute Tribe, California Indian Council/Lulapin, Chilula Tribe, Chimariko, Chukchansi
Yokotch Tribe, Chukchansi Yokotch of Mariposa, Chumash Council of Bakersfield, Coastal Band
of Chumash, Coastanoan Rumsen Carmel Tribe, Coastanoan Band of Carmel Mission Indians,
Coastancan, Ohlone, Mutsun-Rumsen, Dunlap Band of Mono Indians, Esselen Nation, Esselen
Tribe of Monterey County, Federated Coast Miwok, Federation of Coast Miwok,
Gabrielino/Tongva Tribal Council, Indian Canyon Nation, Juaneno Band of Mission Indians, Kern
Valley Indian Community, Chumash, Miwok, Mono Lake Indian Community, Muwekma Ohlone
Tribe, Nor-el-Muk, North Fork Band of Mono Indians, Oak Brook Chumash, Salinan, San Luis
Rey Band, Shasta Nation, Tolowa Nation, Tongva Nation, Traditional Choinumni Tribe,
Tsnungwe Council, United Madu Nation, WashoelPaiute of Antelope Valley, Wintoon Indians,
Wintu Tribe, Wintu of ShastalToyon, Wukchumni Council, and Yokayo Tribe of Indians. Id.
81. See supra note 52.
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within, or in regard to, Indian country when considering the impact of the
UMRA. Where states have such authority, unfunded mandates imposed on
the states by the federal government could result in the state's assertion of
those mandates on tribal governments within those states' boundaries.
Historically the relationships between the tribal governments and the
various states have been tense. The states have often sought to assert
authority into those Indian lands which lie within state boundaries, and over
those persons, Indian and non-Indian who reside in, or do business with,
Indian country. 2 These attempts at the unilateral assertion of state power
have been generally resisted by the Indian nations and found illegitimate by
the Courts. They continue however, and often serve as the basis for
Supreme Court opinions.
A. State Taxation of Indian Lands
The general rule has been that states could not tax tribal trust lands
within a reservation boundary. This was re-affirmed in County of Yakima
v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation,3 wherein
the Court held that if a tribe places land in trust with the federal
government, thus making the land inalienable or prohibited by federal law
from being conveyed, then the property is not subject to ad valorem taxes.
This ruling ensured that if an Indian nation built a casino on land that had
been placed in trust, the state or local units of government would not
receive property tax revenue from the casino. Economic activities carried
on outside Indian country are not tax exempt, unless such activity is
guaranteed in a treaty, such as with hunting, fishing or gathering rights
reserved on lands ceded by the tribal governments.
Yakima was cited in a more recent case, Saginaw Chippewa Indian Tribe
v. State of Michigan," wherein the Chippewa stopped paying taxes on
Indian-owned lands and portions of land owned by the Nation which was
located within the reservation. The local government brought suit and the
U.S. district court held that where the land was alienable, having marketable
title and conveyable without federal restrictions (held "in fee") the state
could tax such land, irrespective of whether it was inside a reservation.85
A process exists for tribal governments to purchase land and then to have
it placed in trust by the federal government.86 This process was recently
amended by the Bureau of Indian Affairs 7 following the decision in South
82. For example, see Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217 (1959).
83. 502 U.S. 249, 270 (1992).
84. 106 F.3d 130 (6th Cir. 1997).
85. Saginaw Chippewa Indian Tribe of Michigan v. Michigan, 882 F. Supp 659, 669 (E.D.
Mich. 1995).
86. 25 C.F.R. § 151.3 (1997).
87. Office of Tribal Justice, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Secretary's Authority to Take Indian Lands
into Trust, NATION TO NATION, Aug. 1996, at 8 [hereinafter Secretary's Authority to Take Indian
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Dakota v. United States Department of Interior,88 wherein the court found
that the trust land designation powers given to the Secretary of the Interior
were an excessive delegation of authority, in that there was no formal
opportunity for an affected city to be involved in the process." In response
the BIA, issued new rules on April 24, 1996, allowing for a thirty-day
notification period, following publication in either a local newspaper or the
Federal Register, of the intent to place a parcel of land into trust," unless
the acquisition of such parcel has been mandated by legislation.9 This then
allows a state, local or city government to provide written comments as to
potential impacts of the proposed acquisition on regulatory jurisdiction, real
property taxes and special assessments. Once such trust status is
determined, the Federal Quiet Title Act9 prohibits further judicial
review. 4
In regard to Indian-owned "in fee" land the issue is not settled. The
Ninth Circuit held in Confederated Tribes & Bands of the Yakima Indian
Nation v. County of Yakima95 that the General Allotment Act authorized
state taxation of land owned individually "in fee" by Indians, which was
within Indian country. This case contradicts the rulings in previous cases
and thus the law, at present is unsettled.96
Any congressional action which results from a study presently being
conducted by the BIA as to the process by which Indian land is placed into
trust could trigger UMRA. UMRA could bar the costs of notification to
local governments as an unfunded mandate, and those which result from any
delay in the trust process, if the costs exceed the statutory minimum."
Thus it is essential to closely monitor any changes in these regulations and
their implementation in Indian country.
B. State Taxation of Income
Income earned from employment on a reservation by the members of
tribal governments residing on the reservation is exempt from state taxes
under the ruling in McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Commission." The
Lands into Trust].
88. 69 F.3d 878 (1996).
89. Doug Peterson, Localities May Have Window to Ask for Court Hearing in Tribal Land
Matters, NATION'S CrnES WKLY., May 13, 1996, at 6.
90. See Secretary's Authority to Take Indian Lands into Trust, supra note 87.
91. 25 C.F.R. §§ 151.10, 151.11 (1997).
92. I1
93. Pub. L. No. 92-562, 86 Stat. 1176 (codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 2409(a)-(g) (1994)).
94. See 25 C.F.R. § 151.12 (1997).
95. 503 F.2d 1207, 1211 (9th Cir. 1990).
96. See, e.g., Bryan v. Itaska Co. 426 U.S. 373 (1976); Moe v. Confederated Salish &
Kootenai Tribes, 425 U.S. 463 (1976).
97. 2 U.S.C. § 658(b) (1994).
98. 411 U.S. 164, 152 (1973).
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U.S. Supreme Court recently cited McClanahan in Oklahoma Tax
Commission v. Chickasaw Nation," and distinguished their ruling in that
case.
Prior to the Chickasaw case, state income taxes were not paid on income
from tribal employment. However, in the Chickasaw case the court ruled
on two questions. On the first, whether the state of Oklahoma could impose
its motor fuels excise tax upon fuel sold by Chickasaw Nation retail stores
on trust land, the Court held that such a tax was unenforceable if its legal
incidence fell on an Indian nation or its members for sales made within
Indian country."° However on the second issue, the Court held that
Oklahoma could tax the income (including wages from tribal employment)
of all persons, Indian or non-Indian, residing outside Indian country.'
Any congressional legislation which mandates the establishment of a
tribal tax collection process, the promulgation of acceptable regulations, and
the incurring of costs which result from the collection and transmission of
these taxes creates a mandate for tribal governments. The tribal
governments could use UMRA to contest these new responsibilities."
C. State Sales Taxes Within Indian Country
The courts have generally held, as in Chickasaw, that states could not
levy state sales tax on members of tribal governments in Indian country.
However, in Washington v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville Indian
Reservation"° , the Court held that a state could impose its cigarette and
sales tax made on sales to non-member Indians in Indian country, so long
as these taxes: (1) did not interfere with the right of the Indian nation to
self-government, and (2) had not been preempted through regulation by the
federal government.
The federal preemption caveat does not require an express congressional
declaration of intent to pre-empt state authority. Rather it is a common
sense standard applied by the courts in conjunction with traditional notions
of sovereignty and self-development." Where, however, the taxes fall
squarely on the non-Indian in Indian country, without interfering with the
rights of the Indian nation to self-government or self-regulation, the courts
99. 515 U.S. 450 (1995).
100. Id. at 463.
101. Id. at 464.
102. 2 U.S.C. § 1501(2) (Supp. 11 1996).
103. 447 U.S. 134, 164 (1980).
104. For examples of the exercise of federal preemption, see McClanahan v. Arizona State
Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164 (1973); New Mexico v. Mescalero Apache Tribe, 462 U.S. 324
(1983); Montana v. Blackfeet Indian Tribe, 471 U.S. 759 (1985); Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. Sac
& Fox Nation, 508 U.S. 1985 (1993).
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have held that they were allowable."°
Any new congressional legislation which creates new requirements for
tribal governments may require funding through the action of UMRA. The
Act may also bar the promulgation of regulations or procedures, the hiring
of personnel to handle the collection and transmission of tax monies, or the
meeting of other requirements if they exceed the amounts set by UMRA for
implementation of the Act."
D. Tribal Taxation
Tribal governments have the right to tax non-Indian business activities
conducted in Indian country, as well as non-Indians, as individuals."0 They
may tax non-Indian purchasers even if the purchase is also taxed by the
state. Thus, in the area of taxation, any mandate considered by Congress
that applies to state and local governments may also apply to tribal
governments. This, then, should trigger a consideration of the applicability
of the UMRA.
E. Indian Gaming
Prior to the U.S. Supreme Court decision in Seminole Tribe of Florida
v. Florida,"° the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act required that a tribe, which
wished to implement casino gambling at a tribally controlled location, must:
(1) negotiate with the state; (2) if agreement was not reached, the tribe
could sue the state in federal court and this court could provide for further
tribal state negotiation; (3) if agreement were not reached within this sixty
day period the state and tribe would each be required to submit their "last
best offer" to a court-appointed mediator who would choose between the
two proposals; (4) if a state refused to agree with the mediator's decision
within sixty days of its announcement; then (5) the Secretary of Interior
could determine the conditions under which Casino (class I) gambling was
authorized to be conducted on the Indian land.m9
In this most recent Seminole decision, the tribe wished to initiate Class
I gaming on its reservation in Florida. Under IGRA rules they initiated the
negotiation process but the state of Florida refused to negotiate a compact.
The tribe then sued the state under IGRA. The Seminole Court held that the
federal government had no authority under the Eleventh Amendment to the
Constitution to subject the states to suit in the courts.' The Supreme
105. Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. Chickasaw Nation, 515 U.S. 450, 464 (1995).
106. 2 U.S.C. § 1514(a) (1994).
107. Washington v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville Reservation, 447 U.S. 134, 164
(1980); Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130, 137 (1981).
108. 116 S. Ct. 1144 (1996).
109. Doug Peterson, Interior Department Requests Comments on Indian Gaming Compacts,
NATION'S C'rns WKLY., May 13, 1996 (on file with the American Indian Law Review).
110. Seminole, 116 S. Ct. at 1119.
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Court did, however, leave IGRA intact, and also reaffirmed the Indian
Commerce Clause of the Constitution confirming that the states 'have been
divested of virtually all authority over Indian commerce and Indian
tribes..'' As a result of this decision, the BIA will have to promulgate
new rules for the approval of Indian gaming. IGRA specifically establishes
that the Secretary of the Interior has the authority to create compacts where
negotiations have not been successfully concluded between a state and a
tribe."' The Department of the Interior established a comment period
(which ended July 1, 1996) in order to solicit input as to the substance of
the new rules."' One should watch this issue as it is unclear what
approach the BIA will take regarding Indian gaming. In any case, any
mandates related to gaming, considered by Congress, are subject to the
considerations of the UMRA, and any affected tribe or tribal governments
under an imposition because of any regulations or requirements should
challenge the proposed mandates if they carry any costs of implementation
or compliance.
VII. Federal Taxation in Indian Country
The federal government is legally able to impose taxes within Indian
country."' Although a tribe may have little say in whether or how much
money is collected, any possible financial burden incurred as a result of
complying with any new regulation could function as the basis of a point
of order pursuant to the UMRA.
Indians, whether working inside or outside of Indian country pay federal
income taxes, as do non-Indians working for tribal governments. However
some types of Indian-income are not taxed. For example, income earned
from allotted trust land, including capital gains, rents and royalties, the sale
of crops or minerals, or the sale of livestock grazed on allotted land, is not
taxed."5 However, the Internal Revenue Service has deemed that the
income of a tribal member from the operation of a shop or service is
taxable as the result of labor, rather than coming from the land itself."6
Further if exempt income is reinvested, any income from the reinvestment
is taxable." '
However, once allotted land is removed from trust and a fee patent is
111. Rick Hill, Requesting a Remedy, INDIAN GAMING, May 1996 at 7.
112. See 25 U.S.C. §§ 2701, 2710 (1994).
113. Id.
114. See CANBY, supra note 53, at 203.
115. See GErcHEs ET AL, supra note 18, at 656-57.
116. INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., INDIAN AssIsTANcE HANDBOOK, INcOME TAXATION
SECTION, TRIBAL MEMBERS, GENERAL RuLEs at 11-12 (on file with the American Indian Law
Review).
117. See 26 C.F.R. § 161-1 (1996); Rev. Rul. 67-284, 1967-2 C.B. 55.
No. 2]
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 1998
AMERICAN INDIAN LAW REVIEW
issued to the allottee, income from the land, as well as the land itself,
becomes taxable.' Further, if an Indian leases trust land from his/her
tribe, any income derived from activities on the land is taxable.""
VIII. Environmental Regulations on Indian Lands
The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has an "Indian policy"
which incorporates federal policies of tribal self-determination in its
environmental regulation on Indian lands. This policy, which was
implemented in November 1984 and re-affirmed in July 1994"2 directs the
EPA to treat Indian nations as states in program implementation. This then
strengthens a tribe's position when challenging any unfunded mandates
imposed by proposed federal legislation.
Although the Indian policy has benefitted and enhanced the regulatory
powers of tribal governments, it has created complications for the regulated
community in that they have had to learn to adapt not only to different
regulatory standards and procedures but also to different legal systems. It
has also increased the potential for conflict and overlap between state,
federal and tribal regulations.
Federal power over tribal governments, tribal land, and non-Indians
dealing with tribal governments is very broad. If an express federal statute
exists, it will control.' State powers over tribal activities are generally
very narrow. State authority will control only when the federal power has
been expressly delegated to the state or when, on balance, the state
regulatory interests are significantly stronger than the federal or tribal
interests.12 The latter is highly subjective, so it is difficult to tell when it
will prevail. States interests are strengthened, however, where a "checker-
boarded" reservation exists and the rights of non-Indians, who reside upon
or own land within the exterior boundaries of a reservation, are at issue.'"
Tribal authority generally extends to the protection of members' health
and safety through the implementation of zoning and regulatory activities
over environmental quality on tribal lands." Under current case law, a
tribe's inherent authority may support tribal regulation of non-Indian
activities affecting reservation water quality,"
2 shoreline protection,' 26
118. Rev. Rul. 58-341, 1958-2 C.B. 400 (modified by Rev. Rul. 62-48, 1962-1 C.B. 131).
119. United States v. Anderson, 625 F.2d 910 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied 450 U.S. 920
(1981).
120. 59 Fed. Reg. 38,460, 38,461 (1994).
121. United States v. Dion, 476 U.S. 734, 898 (1986).
122. Judith v. Royster & Rory SnowArrow Fausett, Control of the Reservation Environment:
Tribal Prinmacy, Federal Delegation, and the Limits of State Intrusion, 64 WASH. L. REV. 581,
612-13 (1989).
123. Brendale v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation, 492 U.S. 408
(1989).
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and tribal sewage treatment.
The EPA, through its 1990 and 1994 actions in affirming the powers of
tribal governments and in delegating specific powers to them, implemented
an "Indian policy" which has significantly limited the role of states in
Indian country." The EPA Indian policy has two major elements: (1) the
EPA or tribal governments, rather than states, should implement federal
environmental statutes on Indian lands, and (2) where authorized, the EPA
will cooperate with and assist tribal governments in developing and
implementing tribal programs under federal environmental statutes. This
"Indian Policy" is now strengthened through the implementation of UMRA,
in that tribal governments are now empowered and protected, as are states,
from the imposition of new federal environmental requirements, without
provision for adequate funding.
IX. The Enforcement of Labor Laws on Indian Land
There is little consistency in the field of labor law and the applicability
of labor regulations in Indian country. Much depends upon the particular
regulation and the particular court rendering the decision. In general, the
Ninth Circuit has held that federal labor laws apply to Indian tribal
employers while other Courts have held differently. 9 Thus, in those
jurisdictions where federal labor laws are held to apply to tribes, any
mandates included in new federal legislation may trigger UMRA.
It appears that generally applicable federal statutes will apply to
reservation Indians unless they conflict with a treaty right or self-
governance." To quote the Labor Law Journal on the subject: "A general
statute in terms applying to all persons includes Indians and their property
interests." Nevertheless, when federal statutes are silent on the issue of
applicability to Indian tribal governments, they must give way to tribal
ordinances when the federal law: (1) encroaches on exclusive rights of self-
governance, (2) abrogates treaty rights, or (3) was intended by Congress not
to apply to Indians."'
Under current law the Occupational Safety and Health Reform Act
(OSHA) is optional to states (as well as to tribal governments).' The Act
126. Confederated Salish & Kootenai Tribes v. Namen, 665 F.2d 951, 965 (9th Cir. 1982).
127. Lummi Indian Tribe v. Hallauer, 9 Indian L. Rep. 3025, 3026 (W.D. Wash. 1982).
128. Lynn H. Slade & Walter E. Stem, Modral, Sperling, Roehl, Harris & Sisk, P.A.,
Environmental Regulations on Indian Lands, A Question of Jurisdiction (visited Nov. 18, 1997)
<http://www.abanet.org/genpractice/f95regs.html>.
129. William Buffalo & Kevin J. Wadzinski, Application of Federal and State Labor and
Employment Laws to Indian Tribal Employers, 25 U. MEM. L. REV. 1365, 1392 (1995).
130. Gerard Morales & Kelly M. Humphrey, Federal Preemption and Tribal Employment
Laws, 44 LAB. LJ. 565 (1993).
131. Id. at 567.
132. 29 U.S.C. § 653(b)(1) (1994).
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is silent as to whether Indian tribal governments are exempt from the health
and safety standards it establishes. Thus, the Ninth and Tenth Circuits have
rendered different conclusions as to whether or not tribal governments are
covered under OSHA."3  Pertinent language in OSHA regulations
promulgated by the Secretary of Labor expressly adopts the Tuscarora rule.
This regulation provides:
The Williams-Steiger Act (OSHA) contains no special
provisions with respect to different treatment in the case of
Indians. It is well settled that under statutes of general
application, such as (OSHA), Indians are treated as any other
person, unless Congress expressly provided for special
treatment. Therefore, provided they otherwise come within the
definition of the term "employer" as interpreted in this part,
Indians and Indian tribes, whether on or off reservations, and
non-Indians on reservations, will be treated as employers subject
to the requirements of the Act.'3
The Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission found that this
language did not cover purely intramural matters of tribal governments. 3
However, if a state or tribal government chooses to participate, the
standards that are set and enforced must achieve the same level of
effectiveness as the federal standards."
X. Civil Rights in Indian Country
Prior to the passage of the Indian Civil Rights Act, (ICRA)'37 the Bill
of Rights in the United States Constitution did not apply in Indian country.
Now, however, due to ICRA, specific elements of the Bill of Rights apply
to tribal constitutions and tribal court decisions and other laws.
133. See generally Donovan v. Navajo Forest Prods. Indus., 692 F.2d 709 (10th Cir. 1982);
United States Dep't of Labor v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm'n, 935 F.2d 182
(9th Cir. 1991).
134. See Buffalo & Wadzinski, supra note 129, at 1383.
135. Secretary of Labor v. Mashantucket Sand & Gravel, 1994 O.S.H.D. (CCH) P42072,
available at 1994 WL 267873 (June 16, 1994).
136. See 29 U.S.C. § 655 (1994).
137. 25 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1326 (1994).
138. These elements of the Bill of Rights which now apply to tribal constitutions and tribal
court decisions include: (1) First Amendment rights of free exercise of religion, free speech,
freedom of the press, right to assemble and right to petition; (2) Fourth Amendment rights of
probable cause and against unreasonable search and seizure; (3) Fifth Amendment rights against
double jeopardy; self-incrimination, and unlawful taling; (4) Sixth Amendment rights to a speedy
trial, trial by jury (if accused of an offense punishable by imprisonment), to be informed of the
charges, compulsory process, and to have defense counsel at own expense (note that this does not
include the mandatory services of a public defender); (5) Eighth Amendment rights against
excessive bail and cruel and unusual punishment; (6) Fourteenth Amendment rights of equal
[Vol. 22466
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The vast majority of claims brought under ICRA are of violation of the
guarantees of due process and equal protection. The United States federal
courts have been generally respectful of tribal rights of self-determination
and self-governance, and have rendered legal decisions that, although
recognizing that due process and equal protection require fair treatment,
have allowed for tribal decisions to reflect tribal values. This allowance for
diversity of law and custom is protected under the language of section 8 of
ICRA,'39 which asserts that no Indian tribe may, in the exercising of its
powers of self-government, "deny to any person within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of its laws or deprive any person of liberty or property
without due process of law."'
Those issues that UMRA is most likely to impact are due process and
equal protection issues, such as removal from office, election issues,
evictions and access to tribal housing, ownership and forfeiture of personal
property, access to courts and jury trials, and fair and non-discriminatory
employment. Tribal advocates should closely scrutinize any proposed
federal legislation in these areas to determine if unfunded mandates are
created for the tribal governments. If so, the tribe should challenge pursuant
to UMRA.
XL Domestic Relations
The United States courts have generally held that domestic relations
within Indian country falls within the parameters of tribal jurisdiction.'
The United States courts have upheld marriages and divorces when
conducted under tribal law, as well as property agreements and probate
actions. Thus, tribal advocates should review any proposed legislative
changes in these areas which create a financial burden in order to ensure
their compliance with the UMRA.
The Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA)4 was enacted in 1978, in order
to protect tribal interests in the placement and adoption of Indian children.
Essentially ICWA empowers tribal governments to influence state court
actions regarding the foster care placement, termination of parental rights
or pre-adoptive/adoptive placement of a child who is either a member of the
tribe or the biological child of a tribal member where the child is also
protection of the laws and due process; and (7) protection against ex post facto laws and bills of
attainder. The ICRA does not include (1) protection against the establishment of religion; (2) a
guarantee of a republican form of government; (3) a privileges and immunities clause; (4)
provisions for the right to vote; (5) a requirement of free counsel for the accused; or (6) the right
to a jury in a civil trial. See Indian Civil Rights Act, 25 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1326 (1994).
139. l §§ 1301-1303.
140. 25 U.S.C. § 1302(8) (1994).
141. See generally CANBY, supra note 53, at 153-57.
142. 25 U.S.C. §§ 1901-1963 (1994).
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eligible for tribal membership. 43
During the 104th Congress ICWA became an issue and change was
attempted, but defeated.'" Rep. Susan Molinari (R.-N.Y.) brought House
Bill 3286, "Adoption Promotion and Stability Act of 1995," to the floor.
This bill would have precluded Indian children from ICWA protection if
their parents did not maintain affiliation with their Indian tribe and would
have required that the tribes act to assert tribal authority within strict time
lines.45 These changes could easily increase the costs to tribes of asserting
jurisdiction over tribal children, as such changes would likely necessitate
additional tribal personnel to produce the requisite paperwork within definite
time lines. This presents another area where tribes might consider utilizing
UMRA.
XIL Regulatory Jurisdiction
In general, tribal governments have exclusive authority to regulate Indian
and non-Indian conduct occurring on trust land in Indian country.'" They
may also regulate the conduct of tribal members off reservation, where
significant tribal interests are at issue.4 ' The United States Supreme Court
has also held that tribal governments may regulate the activity of non-
Indians in Indian country where: (1) the nonmembers have entered into
consensual commercial relationships with the tribe or its members, or where
(2) conduct of non-Indians occurs on land which is legally owned by them
(in fee), within the reservation boundaries, threatens or directly affects the
political integrity, economic security, or health and welfare of the tribe. 4 '
This is an area where there is potentially a significant amount of
legislative activity. Tribal governments have on-reservation authority, to
regulate hunting, fishing and gathering rights, over liquor and tobacco sales,
to regulate mineral sales subject to the Indian Mineral Development Act of
1982 (IMDA), 49 and the Federal Oil and Gas Royalty Management Act
143. 25 U.S.C. § 1911 (1994).
144. Andrea Foster, Panel Endorses Adoption Bill, 55 CONG. Q. 1825, 1874 (1997) (on file
with the American Indian Law Review).
145. ld. Another bill, Senate Bill 569, has been introduced by Sen. John McCain (R.-Ariz.)
and endorsed by the Senate Indian Affairs Committee. This bill would require a notification
period for tribes of all voluntary adoption proceedings involving children of those tribes.
Representative Pryce opposes this legislation, contending that it gives Indian tribes too much
authority over the placement of children. Sen. Orrin Hatch (R.-Utah) has indicated that he intends
to offer an amendment to Senate Bill 569 that would give primary consideration in voluntary
adoptions to the wishes of birth parents over the tribes.
146. Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 557 (1981).
147. See CANBY, supra note 53, at 227-28.
148. Id.
149. 25 U.S.C. §§ 2101-2108 (1994).
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(FORGMA),'" and to implement oil and gas severance taxes, and property
and production taxes under the Indian Tax Status Act of 1982 (ITSA)."'
Thus tribal governments should seek to challenge under UMRA any
proposed legislation that amends or adds regulations that create a financial
burden.
XIII. Criminal Law in Indian Country
In states other than those where Public Law 28017 applies (discussed
below), subject matter jurisdiction of federal, tribal or state courts is usually
determined on the basis of two issues: (1) whether the parties involved in
the incident are Indians, and (2) whether the incidents giving rise to the
complaint took place in Indian country."s For the purpose of this
particular analysis, Indian is defined as a person of Indian blood who is
recognized as a member of a federally-recognized tribe." Indian country
includes 1) all land within the limits of any federal Indian reservation, 2)
all dependent Indian communities, and 3) all Indian allotments.' 5
A. Criminal Jurisdiction Under Public Law 280
Public Law 280l" expressly grants concurrent jurisdiction over Indians
within Indian country to five mandatory states" and allowed other states
to take jurisdiction voluntarily,' with the consent of the tribal
governments. Congress has allowed Public Law 280 states to retrocede the
assertion of jurisdiction on a piece-meal basis,59 so even where it is the
law, Public Law 280 does not apply with every tribe within a given state.
Congress did not grant the states regulatory jurisdiction over Indian
country under Public Law 280. Language in Public Law 280 specifically
precludes the states from taxing the reservations for services, such as law
enforcement and access to state courts, rendered pursuant to such
150. 30 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1757 (1994).
151. Indian Governmental Tax Status Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-473, 96 Stat. 2608 (1982)
(codified at 26 U.S.C. § 7871 (1994)). For more on this subject, see Peter F. Carroll, The
Dawning of a New Era: Tribal Self-Determination in Indian Mineral Production, 9 PUB. LAND
L. REv. 81 (1988).
152. See 18 U.S.C. § 1162 (1994) (criminal jurisdiction); 28 U.S.C. § 1360 (1994) (civil
jurisdiction); 25 U.S.C. §§ 1321-1326 (1994) (assumption of criminal and civil jurisdiction).
153. CANBY, supra note 53, at 97.
154. Id. at 98.
155. Il at 99.
156. 18 U.S.C. § 1162 (1994).
157. California, Minnesota, Nebraska, Oregon, Wisconsin, and Alaska.
158. Florida, Idaho, Iowa, Montana, and Washington. The state of Nevada asserted
jurisdiction and then retroceded. See CAROLE GOLDBERG-AMBROSE, PLANTING TAIL FEATHERS:
TRIBAL SURVIVAL AND PUBLIC LAW 280, at 69 (1997).
159. ld.
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jurisdiction,"6 or from infringing on water rights16' or interfering with,
controlling or regulating any rights or privileges related to hunting, fishing
or trapping afforded under Federal treaty, agreement, or statute.'6
Public Law 280 remains a significant factor in Indian country today. The
Public Law 280 states include those with extremely high proportions of
Indian peoples." Issues arise regarding jurisdiction all the time, and the
creation of any mandates related to criminal or civil procedure in these
affected states would undoubtedly affect Indian reservations and tribal areas.
The Major Crimes Act "gives federal courts jurisdiction over thirteen
violent felonies." The Assimilative Crimes Acte and the Organized
Crime Control Act' 67 have been held to apply to Indian country."~ These or
any other Acts which impose additional responsibilities on tribal
governments could be subject to the UMRA.
B. Law Enforcement Issues
Approximately 170 reservations, of the 230 which are federally
recognized at present, have law enforcement departments. These
departments consist of five types." The types are not mutually exclusive,
so more than one type may operate simultaneously within the boundaries of
a given reservation. 70
The Bureau of Indian Affairs is involved with two types of law
enforcement through the Bureau of Indian Affairs Law Enforcement
160. Id. at 86-89.
161. 28 U.S.C. § 1360(b) (1994).
162. GOLDBERG-AMBROSE, supra note 158, at 45-124.
163. Public Law 280 states at present are the following: "Mandatory," Alaska, California,
Minnesota (except Red Lake), Nebraska, Oregon (except Warm Springs), and Wisconsin. The
"Optional" states, which assumed full or partial jurisdiction are Arizona, Florida, Idaho, Iowa,
Montana, Nevada, North Dakota, South Dakota, Utah, and Washington. See GrCHES ET AL.,
supra note 18, at 484.
164. 18 U.S.C. § 1153 (1994).
165. Murder, manslaughter, kidnaping, maiming, incest, assault with intent to commit
murder, assault with a dangerous weapon, assault resulting in serious bodily injury, arson,
burglary, and robbery are felonies under the Major Crimes Act. See 18 U.S.C. § 1153 (1994).
166. 18 U.S.C. § 13 (1994).
167. 18 U.S.C. § 1955 (1994).
168. See Williams v. United States, 327 U.S. 711 (1946); United States v. Farris, 624 F.2d
890, 897 (9th Cir. 1980).
169. The five types of law enforcement programs operating within Indian country are:
federal law enforcement under BIA-LES, state law enforcement under Public Law 280, tribal
police who are federally funded through the Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance
Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 93-638, 88 Stat. 2203 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 25
U.S.C. (1994), and the Indian Self-Determination Act Amendments of 1994, 25 U.S.C.A. 450
(West Supp. 1997), and tribal police funded solely from tribal funds.
170. BIA-LES Listing of Reservations Where Major Crimes Act Applies by Area Office and
Type of Law Enforcement Program, Revised March 31, 1995.
[Vol. 22
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol22/iss2/4
UNFUNDED MANDATES REFORM ACT
Services. Where Public Law 280 operates, the states are responsible for law
enforcement on the reservation. Throughout the United States, even where
Public Law 280 exists, many Indian nations have their own tribal police that
they fund and control."" These tribal police departments often operate on
reservations covered by other forms of law enforcement, including BIA, 638
and/or Self-governance funded law enforcement programs. All of this, of
course, results in problems of over-lapping jurisdiction and conflicts of
law."
Given the attention paid in recent years to the expansion of law
enforcement services, this area is one where the creation of unfunded
mandates may easily arise. For example, a problem arose recently regarding
criminal statistics obtained from the tribal governments which operate 638
and self-governance police departments." Most tribal governments have
not traditionally provided criminal incident statistics to the U.S. Department
of Justice as is required of all other law enforcement departments in the
United States. Tribal governments have begun to receive federal funding
directly from Congress for crime prevention programs" and through the
Community Oriented Policing Services (COPS) program for the expansion
of tribal law enforcement programs."5 From 1995, funding has included
over $22.4 million for new police services to 128 federally recognized
Indian nations, over $6 million for programs aimed at reducing violence
against women, and almost another $5 million to fund the development of
juvenile justice and other community based programs which emphasize
crime reduction. 76
When tribal governments accept funding, and contract for the provision of
specific law enforcement services, the likelihood increases that federal
legislation will change or increase the regulations under which law
enforcement operates. In fact, the function and potential impact of UMRA
were specifically presented in an article which discussed law enforcement
grants to tribal governments."
It is essential that any tribe that is awarded such grants monitor them
closely for the imposition of any unfunded mandates and challenge them
under the Act if appropriate.
171. For example, Sandia Pueblo, Gila River, Salt River, Pascua Yaqui, and Eastern Band
of Cherokees have both BIA and Tribal Police, and Mille Lacs Chippewa, Oneida, Hoopa and
Sycuan have both Public Law 280 services as well as tribal police.
172. GOLDBERG-AMBROSP, supra note 158, at 1-43.
173. June Kress, Presentation at the Annual Tribal Criminal Law Update Symposium,
Scottsdale, Ariz. (Sept. 1996).
174. Office of Tribal Justice, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Grants and Funding, NATION TO NATION,
Aug. 1996, at 10.
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Id. at 3.
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XIV. Conclusion
The Unfunded Mandates Reform Act is a new and significant factor in
Indian country. As new laws are developed in the fields of labor,
environmental, criminal justice, and taxation, as well as in other realms,
UMRA, particularly if aggressively monitored and pursued, may help tribal
governments cope with any new mandates and responsibilities. For the
proper utilization of UMRA, the following suggestions are recommended:
A. Suggested Amendment to the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act
UMRA is triggered by mandates which have cost estimates in excess of
$50 million. Where proposed legislation affects state, local, and tribal
governments, this number is not difficult to reach. However, when
legislation is directed only at tribal governments, this figure is
astronomically high. As we saw with the Professional Boxing Safety Act
of 1996,178 the likelihood of UMRA being triggered by the fiscal impact
on tribal governments alone is extremely remote, regardless of the
difficulties faced in implementation.
The budgets of tribal governments are tightly stretched even under
normal circumstances. Now, with the recent cutbacks in both services and
funding to tribal governments from the Bureau of Indian Affairs, the
situation is even more dire. There is no question that the additional costs
of implementing new federal mandates could have serious adverse impacts
on the provision of critical services to tribal members. Given this, Congress
should consider amending UMRA to allow for a lower triggering level for
legislation which applies only to tribal governments. This would ensure
equity and allow Indian nations to reap the benefits intended by Congress
when UMRA was passed.
B. Increased Scrutiny of Legislation
The Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995 is only as useful as Indian
nations, Indian law experts, and tribal advocates make it. Indeed, as others
who have written on the Act have asserted,"' the Act has a number of
exclusions that allow Congress to avoid the full impact of the legislation.
Further, given that congressional moderates and liberals of either party are
not enamored of the Bill and its restraints on the enactment of legislation,
use of waivers incorporated into the Act could significantly reduce the
instances where the Act comes into play.
The retention and use of power is difficult to affect. Indeed, even though
this Act was a part of the conservative Republicans' Contract with America,
178. 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 6301-6313 (West Supp. 1997).
179. See Conlon, Deregulating Federalism, supra note 10, at 38.
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the imposition of federal mandates is not limited to liberals. During the
Presidency of Ronald Reagan, a number of new federal mandates were
imposed, even though he had repeatedly spoken out against them." In
fact, by the end of the Reagan-Bush years "the number of major new
intergovernmental regulatory provisions. .. surpassed that of any previous
decade..'.'. Thus, anyone who seeks to reduce the authority of the federal
government must be constantly vigilant, and not assume that conservative
forces will, in fact, guard against the implementation of costly mandated
procedures.
C. Concerted Legal Challenges to the Exercise of Federal Power
Through enactment of UMRA, a clear congressional intention becomes
evident that Congress should exercise discretion in the use of its plenary
power. Although the legislative history of the Act indicates that this
legislation was intended to help the states assert their interests, and that
tribal governments were an afterthought, Indian nations can use this
legislation to argue against the assertion of plenary power, at least as to the
imposition of unfunded mandates. However, other applications may exist
as well. Tribal advocates should use the "states-rights" rationale, which
gave rise to the UMRA, to challenge the assertion of federal plenary power
in the courts.
The exercise of plenary power by the federal government has been a sore
point for many, if not most, Indian nations since the eighteenth century.
Federal plenary power, in its assertion of ultimate authority over Indian
peoples and lands, has hampered tribal government development, hindered
the development of economic resources and has diminished the capacity of
Indian peoples to self-determination." As has been asserted, the
congressional plenary power doctrine "perpetuates and extends the racist
legacy brought by Columbus to the New World of the use of law as an
instrument of racial domination and discrimination against indigenous tribal
peoples' rights of self determination.""
On some levels, one could view the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act as
another "chink in the armor" of plenary power. The federal trend toward
self-determination of Indian tribal governments, aided by tribal economic
180. For example, new mandates enacted during the Reagan presidency included "national
standards for alcohol consumption, underground storage tanks, and trucking standards; required
the removal of asbestos from local schools; and tightened the restrictions of the Clean Air.Act
and the Safe Drinking Water Act." Id. at 25.
181. Id. at 25 n.8.
182. Carole Goldberg-Ambrose, Not "Strictly" Racial: A Response to "Indians as Peoples,"
39 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 169, 176-77 (1991).
183. Robert A. Williams, Jr., Columbus's Legacy: The Rehnquist Courts's Perpetuation of
European Cultural Racism Against American Indian Tribes 39 FED. B. NEws & J. 358, 358-69
(1992), cited in GETcHES, ET AL., supra note 18, at 36.
No. 2]
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 1998
AMERICAN INDIAN LAW REVIEW
and political development, has allowed tribes to emerge as partners in the
formulation of policy as it relates to Indian country."u The enactment of
UMRA with its limitation of federal power to impose requirements and
regulations on Indian tribal governments, unless they are fully funded, is
another resource for Indian country to use to challenge unbridled assertions
of federal power.
One can see in the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act the assertion by
Congress that it recognizes the need to constrain the exercise of its plenary
power. As has been stated:
The practice of using treaty construction rules in non treaty
situations to determine the existence of Indian rights has also
been followed with respect to the extinguishment of Indian
rights. The courts generally have required express action, or
something close to it, in cases dealing with important Indian
rights not directly involving treaties. '
Thus, under the Canons of Construction, the courts could easily determine
that, under the "clear statement" test, Congress, through its passage of
UMRA, has given clear indication that its exercise of plenary power must
be constrained, and apply this analysis in other instances as well. If
Congress recognizes the need to temper its powers in this instance, the
courts should honor this restraint and strictly adhere to the Canons of
Construction as they relate to cases involving Indians and tribal
governments.
The question arises, of course, whether such power is truly eroded when
such erosion is voluntarily entered into by the sovereign exercising such
power. Even though this question may leave us in a quandary, Indian legal
experts and tribal advocates may still use UMRA, as enacted, to advance the
interests of Indian peoples and tribal governments.
There have been relatively few times when Indian nations have been
presented with the opportunity to advance their own self-interests and also
diminish the plenary power of the federal government, through the use of
federal law. The Unfunded Mandates Reform Act is one such opportunity.
How it is used could help determine the course of Indian law and tribal
policy for years to come.
184. GErCHES Er AL., supra note 18, at 284-85.
185. Id. at 345.
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